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11/14/00 Dhlakama Demands Release of Supporters
UN IRIN

"It was a very serious incident, the most serious since the signing if the peace agreement in 1992," the analyst said. "If you look at the number of RENAMO people demonstrating it was a fiasco, but the way the government reacted played into RENAMO's hands." "I suspect that the government will still try and play tough. Instead of releasing those arrested last week, it has started to prosecute them," the political source added.
Newspaper publisher and editor Carlos Cardoza described RENAMO's strategy as part of an "Al Capone syndrome". He alleged it was "politics by pressure, by threats, by attacks," to force the government into a power-sharing arrangement that the former rebel movement has been unable to win through the ballot box. However, he stressed there are hardline elements within FRELIMO likely to argue that RENAMO's provocation should be met by force. "There is a worry in the air that the hardline elements in RENAMO and FRELIMO will feed on each other and there will be a snowball effect," Cardoza said. He suggested that a way forward could be a commission of inquiry as suggested by Anglican Archbishop Dom Denis Sengulane, as part of a wider appeal "to cool things down". "I think an inquiry would point fingers in both directions," added Cardoza.

11/14/00 Government Vows To Deal With Murderous Rioters Panafrican News Agency

Madeira pointed out that, although they did not abide by the legal norms, in several parts of the country the police not only allowed RENAMO demonstrations to take place on Thursday, but also gave them protection. He claimed that among these places were Mocuba, Gurue, Lugela, Ile and Inhassunge in the central province of Zambezia, some districts in the northernmost province of Niassa and Maputo City. But elsewhere, what had been billed as "peaceful demonstrations" instead took the form of "violent rebellion". Madeira gave some additional information on the riots.
He claimed that in Mogovolas district, in Nampula province, RENAMO attacked, looted and vandalised the district administration and the health post in the district capital, Nametil. "Efforts to restore public order and tranquillity led to the death of six citizens, while four others were wounded", he said. Madeira said there were also two deaths in Moma district, one on Mozambique Island and one in Nampula city. In the town of Caia, in Sofala province, on the south bank of the Zambezi, two rioters were shot during an assault on the district administration. RENAMO penetrated the administrator's office where they "destroyed important state documents," said Madeira. According to him, one of the rioters was killed inside the office "where he was brandishing a firearm", while a second was killed outside "where, with a gun at the ready, he was covering a third who was tearing down the national flag".

"These violent, bloody and lethal acts are not in tune with the concept of demonstrations upheld in the legal framework of any democracy", declared Madeira. He claimed that the government had no choice but "to act rapidly, decisively, effectively and without hesitation to impose respect for the law, and to restore public order, security and tranquillity, using to this end the force strictly necessary in accordance with each specific suggestion". Madeira suggested that not all of the 34 dead civilians had been participants in the demonstration. Some had been passers-by caught up in the violence "as they were peacefully going about their legitimate and routine activities."

11/13/00 Illegal marches   AIM

reference tools

1/22/00 Renamo plans HQ move   BBC
Mozambique's main opposition party, Renamo, says it's decided to move its headquarters from the capital, Maputo, to its stronghold, the port of Beira. The move would be illegal, as current legislation requires all political parties to be based in the capital.

Congress

State Dept   on Mozambique embassy   research links

excerpt   Historical context   Mike Rupiya, Conciliation Resources

Under varying degrees of Portuguese influence from the 15th cent., systematic colonial rule only took root in the early 1900s. With decline of slave trade a few decades earlier, Portugal established sugar & cotton plantations and developed domestic textile industry. These commercial activities weren't tremendously successful; formal economy soon dependent on remittances from migrant labourers and on the transit of goods between land-locked neighbours and Indian Ocean. British chartered companies domination and other foreign concessionaries at large in S. Africa in early years of this century. Only after 1941, when last of company charters lapsed, Mzb was first governed as a single economic & administrative unit. In 1951, Mzb became an overseas province of Portugal which, unlike most other colonial authorities of the time, stated it would never decolonise. … Like other minority white regimes in region, Portuguese Mzb was also segregated along racial lines. Strict qualification criteria ensured less than 1% of black Mozambicans became full citizens.

In 1962, Eduardo Mondlane united nationalist groups to form the Mzb Liberation Front (Frelimo), first concerted opposition to colonial rule. In 1964, with radical African, Arab, Eastern European & Chinese aid, Frelimo began armed struggle against colonial regime. In subsequent years, the movement suffered considerable political infighting which resulted in a series of violent internal purges. In 1969, the party was further destabilised by the assassination of Mondlane in Dar-es-Salaam. Despite persisting internal problems, new leader Samora Machel quickly consolidated control over Frelimo and its military fortunes gradually improved. Frelimo’s expansion in the late 1960s from strongholds near Tanzanian border into NW province of Tete, represented a major psychological blow to Portuguese.
In response, colonists launched 1970 Operation Gordian Knot, biggest ever counter-offensive, using napalm & ‘scorched earth’ counterinsurgency tactics. During this campaign, rural poor were treated very harshly, many forcibly relocated to tightly controlled settlements known as aldeamentos. In Dec.72 Portuguese commandos massacred hundreds of civilians in attack on Tete village of Wiriamu. In attempt to bolster its position, colonial regime also sought to draw S.Africa into the war and to create white buffer zone across the region, involving Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project on Zambezi river. By April 1974, however, domestic disillusionment over colonial wars in Mzb, Angola & Guinea Bissau culminated in military coup in Lisbon. For Mzb, Portuguese revolution precipitated near immediate withdrawal of the 60K colonial troops based there.
In response to coup & fearing black rule, colonial hard-liners seized radio station in capital, calling for Rhodesian-style Unilateral Declaration of Independence. This achieved little more than riots in black suburbs; 7 Sept.74 Lusaka Accord was signed, formally ending colonial rule and handing power to Frelimo-dominated transitional govt. Speed of this settlement caught Frelimo by surprise. With little military success in the cities and advances in many rural areas slowing, some rebel leaders had predicted 10 more years of armed struggle before independence could be achieved.

A Brave New Dawn?
25 June 1975, Samora Machel became president of independent People’s Republic of Mzb. Even by standards of post-colonial Africa, however, Republic was a markedly fragile entity. Physical infrastructure was not extensive and much of what did exist had been established only recently to support the colonial war effort. Much of the Portuguese professional class also fled at independence, leaving the economy and administration in hands of inexperienced Frelimo cadres with little formal training. Over 90% of population was illiterate, while widespread sabotage by embittered ex-colonists further undermined the country’s ability to rebuild. In midst of disarray, Frelimo asserted its own vision of national unity, swiftly consolidating one- party rule and implementing measures to limit opposition and establish control over populace. Several opposition leaders, along with Frelimo dissidents, were immediately arrested and sent to ‘re-education camps’ in far north. Reports of torture and other mistreatment at some of these camps are little discussed publicly today. Dynamising Committees (GD) were later set up, exercising extensive powers to supplant traditional authorities in the rural areas and to send ‘unproductive’ urban residents for re-education. Natl Service for Public Security (SNASP) was also established, a secret police service with sweeping authority to detain those suspected of anti-state activities. Finally, there was crackdown on religious groups. Roman Catholic church, judged to have allied itself with the colonial regime, was especially targeted, though an estimated 10,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses were also despatched for re-education.

Large-scale social development programs simultaneously launched throughout country were radical transformation of social & material bases. Privately- owned schools, hospitals and missions were rapidly nationalised, number of primary school students doubled in just seven years, while number of health clinics quadrupled within the decade, winning great international acclaim for the new govt. At Frelimo’s 3rd Party Congress Feb.77, liberation movement was formally transformed into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party with a mission ‘to lead, organise, orientate, and educate the masses, thus transforming the popular mass movement into a powerful instrument for destruction of capitalism & construction of socialism’. ‘Mass democratic organisations’ were set up to mobilise and ensure Frelimo control of workers, women, youth and journalists. Mzb also established links with the Soviet Union and with E.European nations which provided essential political and military support.
Despite nationalist rhetoric, certain groups received preferential treatment under new administration and tensions sharpened in some rural areas. State farms, mainly large estates abandoned by the Portuguese, received massive investment, while peasant production for local markets fell into sharp decline. Resentment generated among rural people was heightened further by Frelimo’s largely compulsory ‘villagisation’ program. Although proportion of peasant population living in communal villages never exceeded 15 per cent, this program and parallel marginalisation of traditional authorities provided political environment ripe for exploitation by Frelimo’s opponents.
With Rhodesian forces and internal opposition groups' attacks on govt in the late 1970s, the army further promoted the communal villages for their counter- insurgency value. This allowed greater control over the rural population, but reminded many of the colonial aldeamentos. This led to increased ambivalence and hostility towards the govt which exacerbated civil conflict.

Neighbourly Terror
Since late 1970s, principal group opposing the Frelimo govt has been Mzb National Resistance (MNR, later Renamo), formed in 1977 by Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) in the face of President Machel’s growing support for the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (Zanla), and his enforcement of United Nations sanctions against the Rhodesians. In its early years, Renamo comprised soldiers who had fought with Portuguese during the colonial war as well as Frelimo dissidents. Initial objectives were to destabilise Mzb govt and provide intelligence on Zanla guerrillas operating within its borders. In pursuing these aims, Renamo initially enjoyed limited grass-roots support and did not pose a serious military threat to Frelimo. This changed after 1980.     [ Reagan election ]
With Zimbabwe’s transition to majority rule, control of Renamo was handed to S.African Military Intelligence Directorate (MID). After a year of relative calm, while S.Africans reviewed and reoriented Renamo operations, Mozambican war escalated. S.Africa’s aims in revitalising Renamo were to counteract Mzb’s support for armed opposition to apartheid, and to block landlocked Zimbabwe’s access to sea through Mzb, thus increasing S.African dominance of regional economy. Under tutelage of apartheid regime, Renamo’s strength quickly increased from 500 to 8,000 fighters. By 1982, the rebels were active in most of Mzb and posed a serious military threat to the govt. While S.African support for Renamo was reduced following 1984 Nkomati accord, change in strategy allowed rebel group to continue functioning. Immediately after the agreement, the South African military covertly airlifted huge quantities of arms to Renamo bases inside Mzb and advised the rebels to adopt new insurgency tactics.

[ birth of global "counter-terrorism" under Reagan synchronous to adoption of terror tactics by "anti-Marxists" ]

Immediately following expulsion from Malawi, Renamo units launched biggest ever offensive along length of the Zambezi valley, threatening to cut country in two and allow the rebels an alternative govt in north. With support of Tanzanian and Zimbabwean forces, Mzb army launched successful counter-offensive, a turning point in conflict. Hundreds of thousands of refugees pushed into neighbouring countries, while some of war’s biggest massacres took place in Inhambane and Gaza provinces. By late 1988, with external support in rapid decline, it was clear to both sides war was stalemate.

Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact
In 1984, Mzb & S.Africa signed Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact meant to lay the groundwork for a cessation of hostilities. In exchange for S.Africa halting support for Renamo, Mzb would close down ANC military operations from its territory. S.African mediated negotiations also took place between Frelimo and Renamo to reach lasting settlement. Talks quickly collapsed under pressure from the S.African military and other groups. While Frelimo largely stuck to terms of the Nkomati accord, S.Africans did not, publicly conceding in 1985 that ‘technical violations’ had occurred. By year’s end, it was clear the Nkomati initiative had failed.

Talking Peace
Under 1986 president Joaquim Chissano, negotiated end to conflict was again given serious consideration. In 1987-88, Chissano began major review of Frelimo’s economic, foreign and civil rights policies, which Machel had been considering before his untimely death. Reforms incl reconciliation with Catholic Church and formal retreat from Marxism made progress for peace. In Sept.88, Pres. Chissano met S.African Pres. Botha at Songo in Tete province and secured pledge to abide by the Nkomati accord which this time was largely honoured. He also gave permission to senior leaders of Roman Catholic, Anglican and Protestant Churches to open direct contacts with Renamo leaders. This led to significant breakthrough in Feb.89 when church leaders returned from talks in Kenya with clear message that Renamo too was tired of war and open to negotiations.
At Frelimo’s 5th Congress in July 1989, Marxism-Leninism was officially abandoned as party ideology and negotiations with Renamo accepted. Meanwhile, throughout middle year, Kenyan Pres. Daniel arap Moi and Pres. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe facilitated talks between Renamo and church leaders in Nairobi. In Aug., govt and Renamo used this forum to set conditions for further dialogue. These declarations highlighted how far there was still to go before direct negotiations would be possible. Nevertheless, they indicated will to end the war now existed on both sides.

Nairobi 1989 - Renamo at the Crossroads
After years of guerrilla warfare, Renamo was poorly prepared for civilian life and transition to parliamentary politics. Its major challenge was to transform itself from purely military organisation into viable political party. Rebels needed coherent ideology as well as organisational structure to explain views. Renamo's political pronouncements to date had been blunt anti-Marxist, pro- capitalist, pro-democracy terms, but capacity to debate these issues was very limited. In exchange for offering Frelimo benefits of peace, Renamo needed guarantees of security and financial assistance before it would give up fighting.
Direct peace talks began in Rome in July 1990, hosted by the Sant’ Egidio Catholic lay community, which enjoyed the confidence of both antagonists. After 5 rounds of talks, partial ceasefire in December. In return for confinement of Zimbabwean troops along the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors, Renamo agreed to cease attacks on these strategic trade routes, effectively separating Zimbabwean interests from the Frelimo-Renamo conflict. This ceasefire was seriously weakened within the month, with violations by both sides, but contacts between the parties continued through intermediaries.

For most of 1991-92, negotiations stalled in absence of formula that would recognise ‘sovereignty’ of the govt while guaranteeing Renamo’s acceptance as a political party of equal standing to Frelimo. As fighting persisted, widespread drought and chronic food insecurity in rural areas injected new urgency into peace process. Crucially, Renamo’s ability to live off local population was steadily undermined by drought. As rebels were pushed increasingly into a corner, Zimbabwe and other regional powers increased pressure on the two parties to reach a settlement.
After 7 more tortuous rounds of dialogue, Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama finally signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome on 4 Oct.92. Italian govt hosted the talks and gave Renamo significant financial incentives to secure compliance. U.S., Britain, France, Portugal & U.N. also provided political and technical support, ensuring implementation of the GPA would have broad intl backing. This was crucial because the accord was in many ways flawed. Not only had many practical elements been insufficiently discussed, but both sides lacked capacity to set up and operate the complex structures required for implementation.

The Perils of Implementation
One week after signing of the GPA, UN Security Council approved establishment of the United Nations Operation in Mzb (ONUMOZ) to monitor and verify implementation. First task of 6,800 force was monitor withdrawal of Malawian and Zimbabwean troops from Beira, Limpopo and Nacala transport corridors. ONUMOZ also responsible for overseeing cantonment, demobilisation and disarmament of approximately 110,000 soldiers from both sides, creation of a new natl army, resettlement of between five and six million refugees and displaced people, and organisation of elections. Orig. scheduled for Oct.93, elections were delayed by one year due to persisting distrust between govt and Renamo and slowness of ONUMOZ deployment.
While ceasefire was respected more or less promptly by both sides, cantonment and demobilisation were delayed as neither side wished to give strategic advantage. Renamo sought guarantees that areas under its control would not be over-run by the army, while govt feared rebels would renege on agreement as Natl Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents had recently done in Angola. UN Special Rep. Aldo Ajello diplomatically allowed for delays and placated Renamo with frequent high-level visits to its HQ. In July 1993, this strategy changed, however, as UN deployment reached full strength and the Security Council hardened its position.

In response to UN pressure, Chissano and Dhlakama met for the first time on Mzb soil in Aug.93. This summit slightly eased political tensions, although new obstacles soon appeared, notably Renamo’s insistent demand for funding for transition into political party. Open signs of Renamo hostility to the UN, and a demand for elections before complete demobilisation brought UN SecGen Boutros-Ghali visit in Oct. to seek breakthrough. This visit achieved compromise on sensitive issues surrounding electoral law as well as cantonment and demobilisation of regular troops.
With conditions in camps poor and indiscipline widespread, demobilisation phase was still marked by riots and mutual suspicion and, by late 1994, natl army was only half the strength envisaged in the GPA. Although shortfall was mostly due to large number of combatants opting unilaterally for civilian life, both sides also sought to retain a reserve military force, either hiding troops or claiming they were ‘non-cantonable’. In short, widespread signs of war weariness, but threat of renewed violence and banditry remained. Although both sides pledged to disarm completely prior to elections, UN found it impossible to enforce over- ambitious commitments made in the GPA.

In election camnpaign, Dhlakama made increasingly strident demands for bipartisan ‘govt of natl unity’ to be formed after vote. In response, churches and several Western countries sought to arrange Renamo/govt pre-election ‘deal’ to avert a walk-out by Renamo. Despite two meetings with Dhlakama in Sept., Chissano continued to reject such a deal. Instead, he offered his rival the status of ‘Leader of the Opposition’, complete with salary and benefits, incl diplomatic passport. Privately, he reserved the right to negotiate a deal, but only in the event of unfavourable election results.
Through Oct.94, govt and Renamo waged low-key electoral campaigns. Despite some intimidation in stronghold areas of both sides, elections took place peacefully Oct.27-29. Of 5.2 million registered voters,

[ There were this many refugees alone. ]

[ In 2000 U.S. presidential election, 55% of eligible population either did not vote or voted 3rd party ]

Voting Patterns in the 1994 Elections
Voting patterns emerging in the 1994 elections gave grounds both for optimism and caution regarding prospects for reconciliation in Mzb. At natl level, relative parity between parties could lend itself to enhanced political stability nation-wide. Regional voting patterns confirmed, however, that ethnic and regional differences traditionally dividing Frelimo and Renamo will continue to play a key role in post-war politics. In some areas, election outcomes were influenced by calls for tactical voting from community and church leaders. Reflecting a widespread desire for reconciliation, many heeded this call, voting Chissano for president, while backing Renamo for the National Assembly.

"Since UN forces left in 1995, the country has been at relative peace." ( more on recent obsolete product dumping in Mzb )

2/24/00 Mzb economic hopes washed away   BBC

The past year has seen Frelimo re-elected in Mzb's second elections since the end of the war, and the first to be organised by Mozambican officials. A stock exchange was launched, indicating how far Frelimo has travelled from its Marxist roots. In November 1999, Queen Elizabeth visited Maputo and praised the country's move from civil war to peace saying it was an example to other African states and strife-torn nations elsewhere in the world. Now the floods are undoing all the hard work. Roads and bridges are destroyed, crops ruined and hundreds of thousands made homeless. Aid workers are saying it will take two years just to get back to where Mzb was before the rains came.

"Economic miracle" still predicated on labor subjugation to foreigners as with tyrannical Portuguese colonialism
11/13/97 Mozambique's new Afrikaner "Trekkers"   BBC

8/13/97 Mozambique Growth Not Without Pains   AP

6/12/98 Mozambique News Online

[ Cholera being caused by large scale taint of water supplies, this was likely in a period of drought which has perennially alternated with vast floods in Mzb ]

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