Stephen J. Solarz   nee D-NY 13^thDist. 1975- 93   bio   clientele

"To me, the important question is, how much money is available ?" Solarz test imony 2/26/97 House Intl Relations Committee NEW THINKING ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 2/14/00 UNI   high$ D.C. foreign lobby battles   Apco Assoc. Council on Foreign Relations   Ctr for Strategic & Intl Studies NED   ICG board
Dir. Santa Fe Intl Corp, principal shareholder SFIC Holdings (Cayman) Inc, wholly owned subsidiary of Kuwait Petroleum Corp

Spring 1993 "Congressman from Istanbul"
V.B. Saeedpour Dir.Research, Ctr for Research, Kurdish Library
"… former Democratic House member Steven Solarz of Brooklyn, called by the Turkish press a "proTurkish Congressman." (Hurriyet 12.9.85) This wasn't always the case. As a freshman in Congress Solarz actually co-introduced Res. 269 to designate April 24, 1975 as a "Day of Remembrance of Man's inhumanity to Man" and Res. 148 to commemorate victims of genocide, both incl Armenians. When a year later he authored legislation requiring the National Institute of Education to develop a genocide curriculum, he recommended the Holocaust and the Genocide for inclusion. In 1982 letter to Armenian organization, Solarz said, "I have no personal doubt, and indeed have said on many public occasions that the slaughter of a million or more Armenians by the Turks was one of the most unjust and unconscionable events of human history, and I certainly join you in deploring it."
Like weather, Solarz turned. Reportedly informed by letter from the Jewish community in Turkey that refusal to cooperate could jeopardize their well being, Solarz, in subsequent statement on resolution introduced in 1985, justified change of heart in this way "One of the problems with this resolution is that it asserts what happened to the Armenians was a genocide when the fact that it was a genocide is itself in dispute...There is no evidence that I am aware of which demonstrates that the Ottomans were trying to exterminate all Armenians." (Congressional Record 12.12.85) With the passing of time, his opposition increased. In 6/88 letter to obtain financial support from Turkish physicians, Congressman S. wrote, 'For over a decade in the U.S. Congress I've worked hard to advance the interests of the Turkish people.'"

Jan. 93 Wash.Rpt MidEast Affairs "Solarz' Indian Dreams Dashed"
Paul Findley, former Cong., chair Council for Natl Interest Wash.DC
Before 1992 elections, Solarz' future seemed secure. In 5 easy campaigns for re- election in his heavily Jewish Brooklyn district, he worked hard & successfully in securing contributions for future election campaign needs. He didn't need the money and allowed it to accumulate year after year until, in early 1992, it topped $2 million, an all- time high for members of the House of Representatives. First hard blow came when congressional district he represented for 10 years was divided into 6 parts, each added to adjoining district. Eager to stay in the House, Solarz decided his best bet was to seek nomination in nearby district in which Hispanic citizens predominate but with few Jews. To win, Solarz would have to defeat five other candidates, each with Hispanic ancestry. If re-elected, he would be the number two Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, with a good prospect of later becoming chairman. His campaign fund was greater than the aggregate of all five opponents. But his &/or his wife's mishandling of personal finances was likely the worst obstacle in his ill-fated campaign for re-election to Congress as well as his subsequent quest for a diplomatic post.
NewYork Times over the years carried abundant positive publicity about his exploits for Israel but published an article about his bad debts. Despite generous congressional salary & earnings of his wife, Solarz established a record of not paying bills. Still worse, he emerged as one of worst offenders in highly publicized scandal two years ago over abuse of the House bank. In recent years, he had written 743 overdrafts on his personal account at the bank. While he eventually made good on all of the overdrafts, the level of these abuses aroused broad protest. He lost the nomination.

With Bill Clinton as president, Solarz began aggressive campaign to win a major foreign policy position in the new administration. He openly sought appt as Secretary of State, then shifted to position of permanent US rep at UN. Those efforts failing, he sought selection as ambassador to Japan. When that position went to former VP W.Mondale, Solarz turned attention to India & emerged as leading candidate. Pending normal FBI check into his background, Solarz occupied a temporary office in the State Dept & awaited presidential orders to go to New Delhi. New York City weekly newspaper that specializes in news related to India reported unusual delay in the long expected formal nomination of Solarz, for many years Capitol Hill's leading proponent of Israeli interests, as President Bill Clinton's ambassador to New Delhi. According to the report, the appt was anything but certain. Suggesting big trouble, the administration had not sent notice of intent to New Delhi, a notification that normally is made in advance of ambassadorial appts. 2 days later, syndicated columnist Robt Novak reported, "New York Democrats this past week were informed that after routine FBI investigation Solarz was out of the picture totally & permanently." New Yorkers were told Solarz will not be named to "the promised post of ambassador to India or to any other federal job."

U.S. foreign-policy makers like Solarz follow the Kissinger doctrine of nurturing, not solving, the Third World disputes that keep people who seek freedom and democracy poor and suppressed. To keep the support of the American public now that the communist empire is gone, such members of the political/ military establishment are creating a new bogeyman they call Islamic fundamentalism. Indian rulers, inheritors of the British Empire, eagerly dance to this tune. They portray the centuries-old struggle for self-determination, democracy and freedom from autocratic rule by the Kashmiri people, most of whom are Muslims, as a religious separatist movement.

10/93 "Kashmiri view: Issue is Suppression of Self-Determination"
R.A. Khan, dir. L.A. based Kashmir HumanRights Fdtn The Washington Report p37

The threesome will also work to facilitate a complex $2.5 billion oil pipeline deal the U.S. strongly backs in the Caspian region for geopolitical reasons. But the project has faced enormous financing difficulties & political problems: American oil companies & some outside analysts warn the quantities of proven oil in the Caspian area are still not great enough to justify the costs. As conceived, the pipeline would carry oil from Baku in Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, a 1,200-mile route. Some oil lobbyists suggest that Turkey's hiring of the new team is a harbinger of efforts to get new financial concessions to help build the pipeline. "It could be the start of transforming U.S. support from political support to other, more tangible support, such as concessionary financing," said one source. "This particular pipeline is troubled," Livingston acknowledges. "We hope we can overcome the obstacles and push it forward … If it's good economics, it will probably happen." For its Turkish work, Solomon's firm will receive $700,000 from the $1.8 million contract. [ 39% ]

Megiddo

State Dept   on Kurdistan   research links

Turkey   govt   D.C. embassy   PM's infobureau

Turkey admits Iraqi air raid, probes casualty claims
8.18.00   AFP English

In February 2000, the State Department's human rights bureau released a scath ing report on Turkey's record in 1999. It still flunked all seven benchmarks.

" … highlights of Turkey's history. The Ottoman forebears of the modern Turks swooped down from outer Mongolia to conquer the Middle East up to the borders of the Persian Empire and to occupy a vast domain populated by Christians and Muslims. Details of the conquests still live in dusty stacks in our nation's libraries, though they remain an enigma to most Americans who still have trouble locating that part of the world on the map. And what a dismal history it is.
The Janissaries, crack troops of the Ottoman Sultan, were Christian boys forcibly taken from their mothers before they reached the age of eight and raised as Muslims and defenders of the Empire. As men they were turned loose to murder those who gave them life. History holds other times when Christian mothers wept. For instance, on September 18,1824, nearly 2 centuries ago, the Salem Observer informed Massachusetts readers of "the cruelties of the Turks. On entering Melenia, they put to the sword all the Christians above eight years of age, and at Pergamos, they massacred in thirty eight hours, ten thousand Christians." NewYork Times of October 11,1917 noted that before the first crusade, the Arabs had never persecuted Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre, "But the Seljukian Turks changed all that when they occupied all Syria and the Holy Land in the eleventh century. They persecuted Arab, Jew & Christian pilgrim alike."

Five years later, American Consul to Smyrna, George Horton penned these unhappy words: "I have often been impressed with the hopelessness of making people who have not been eye- witnesses, comprehend the dreadful character of the massacres which are carried on by the Turks against the Christian population of the Orient … One of the keenest impressions which I brought away with me from Smyrna was a feeling of shame that I belonged to the human race … the Turks were glutting freely their racial and religious lust for slaughter, rape and plunder within a stone's throw of the Allied and American battle-ships because they had been systematically led to believe that they would not be interfered with … And this, the presence of those battle-ships in Smyrna harbor, in the year of our Lord 1922, impotently watching the last great scene in the tragedy of the Christians of Turkey, was the saddest and most significant feature of the whole picture … Christians were abandoned as no Christian power desired to offend the Turk, from whom great benefits were expected...It is a curious fact that the Turk is still able to deceive Europeans, despite long observation of his tactics' (Report on Turkey, USA Consular Documents)"
More than 160,000 military & police made eastern Turkey into a war zone, and travel is strictly controlled. The 750,000-member Turkish military has staged three coups since 1960 in fear of Muslim fundamentalism upsetting Turkey's secular traditions. Turkish PM Necmettin Erbakan & his Islamic-led government resigned 6/97 before he became 4th coup.

ATAA Assembly of Turkish American Associations   Turkish Press Review

5/22/00 Time "Human Rights Leave Chopper Deal in a Spin"
10/5/00   "Turkey Warns of Retaliation If U.S. Makes Genocide Charge" ISTANBUL WashPost   Turkish officials warned US risks losing use of Turkish base for air patrols over northern Iraq if House approves resolution accusing Turkey of genocide against Armenians 80 years ago. In response, Turkish officials considering appointing Baghdad ambassador for first time since end of Gulf War in 1991 and will join nations sending aid to Iraq despite U.N. sanctions. Leaders of all five parties in Turkish parliament declared "Grand National Assembly will evaluate extension of Operation Northern Watch" U.S. & British patrols from Turkey's Incirlik air base to northern Iraq to enforce U.N. restrictions on Iraqi military deployments. Turkish parliament votes every six months on whether to renew approval for Incirlik. Current extension ends Dec. 30.
Western diplomats said Turkish measures unlikely as hurt itself as much US. Skepticism Turkey stop Incirlik patrols because Iraq then launch military operations forcing thousands of Kurd refugees into Turkey where Turkish military fighting Kurdish separatists for 15 years. Turkey might retaliate more strongly against Armenia, with whom has no diplomatic relations. Turkey set tough new visa restrictions on Armenians today. Armenian Foreign Ministry welcomed House vote and called on Turkey to begin dialogue on genocide issue & economic cooperation, Russian news agency Interfax reported. Clinton opposes resolution, spoke with Turkish Pres. A. Necdet Sezer Monday before committee vote. Turkish news media reported govt considering other retaliation, incl dropping scheduled negotiations U.S. defense contractor Bell-Textron to buy 145 attack helicopters costing an estimated $4.5 billion.

As many as 12 to 15 million Kurds live in Turkey (third of Turkey's members of parliament and foreign ministers have Kurdish background). … When Ottoman Empire disbanded at the end of WW1, western Allies created country of Kurdistan in 1920 with Treaty of Sevres. They changed their minds in 1923, when they decided it was more expedient to suck up to Turkey and make it an anti-communist buffer zone against Russia. However, 1923 treaty of Lausanne did provide for basic recognition and rights, largely ignored by Turkey and Iraq. … The outlook for the Kurds is dim since their demands for a new homeland would not only remove a major chunk of Turkey but a major portion of Iran, Iraq and Syria as well. They also run up against Turkey's goal of uniting the various peoples within its border and the call for peaceful and political settlements to rights, but they maintain a hard line on secessionist groups. Even if Turkey were to be conciliatory, many people forget that the PKK is waging a battle on four fronts (not including its terrorist activities in Europe) and has little chance of convincing the hard-line governments of Iraq, Iran and Syria to give them concessions. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan ran operations out of comfortable house in Damascus, Syria & Bekaa Valley until lured into capture & Turkish death sentence as terrorist

The PKK targets the local population and is on the run from the Turkish Special Ops teams. The PKK controls the countryside at night, and the government controls the major cities. There is continual warfare on a daily basis, as the Turkish government seeks to annihilate the 10,000 or so ground troops the PKK has in the country. The PKK shows no quarter to Kurds they think are sympathizers, yet are surprisingly lenient with foreigners they kidnap. Of the 20 or so foreigners they kidnap in a year, all are released without harm. To root out remaining pockets of rebel resistance in eastern Turkey, the govt relocated some 3000 subsistence farmers who were thought to be PKK sympathizers. Those with the brains to keep their political sympathies to themselves, about 70,000 considered loyal to govt, were rewarded with a gun & $200 a month in cash and instructed to defend their villages, hardly night watchman's pay in eastern Turkey. These guys have become target practice for hungry soldiers and rebels alike. The army tends to burn entire villages to the ground for a few loaves of bread, while the PKK simply kill the village guards and take the community's food. An average of 10 village guards a month are killed.>br>

In 1993, the Kurds began a sporadic bombing campaign in Istanbul & Antalya designed to scare off Western tourists. In Europe in 1993, Kurds created global publicity with series of terrorist activities against Turkish embassies & businesses (airline offices, banks and travel agents). Germany, with Turkish community of more than 2 million (quarter of them Kurds), was understandably nervous about becoming a battleground and quickly banned 36 Kurdish political organizations. France also banned two Kurdish political groups, and Great Britain is trying to figure out how to stop the regular extortion of Turkish emigrants and/or their businesses by the Kurds. While the U.S. turns a blind eye to the PKK atrocities in Turkey, it is actively using the Kurds to help destabilize Hussein in Iraq.

DangerFinder Fielding Worldwide 1998

Iraq   govt

4 million Kurds live in Iraq.
from1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices re Iraq
Sunni Kurds are approximately 18-20% population. Except in Kurdish- controlled northern areas, citizens legally may not assemble other than to express support for the regime. In northern Iraq, many independent newspapers appeared over past 7 years, as have opposition radio & tv broadcasts. Absence of central authority permits significant freedom of expression, including criticism of the regional Iraqi Kurdish authorities; however, most journalists are influenced or controlled by various political organizations. Although the rival Kurdish parties in northern Iraq, the PUK & KDP, state that full press freedom is allowed in areas under their respective control, in practice neither effectively permits distribution of the opposing group's newspapers & literature. In northern Iraq, all central govt functions been performed by local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the Govt withdrew its military forces & civilian administrative personnel from area after 1991 uprising. A regional parliament & local govt administrators elected in 1992. This parliament last met in May 1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de facto control of northern Iraq, the KDP & the PUK, battled one another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July. The cease-fire held throughout the year; however, reunification measures were not implemented and no election was held.

The regime continued intermittent shelling of villages in Kurdish administered north. Some deaths were reported. No hostilities reported between two major Iraqi Kurdish parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. KDP and PUK reiterated 9/98 agreement to begin returning to rightful homes many thousands each had expelled as result of intra-Kurdish fighting in 3 northern provinces; however, no effort to implement the agreement was begun during the year. AINA reports KDP imposed a blockade on eight Assyrian villages in the Nahla area east of Aqra 8/25. ICRC monitors in northern Iraq intervened on villages' behalf; blockade was lifted. During night of August 27, KDP forces reportedly reentered the village of Kash Kawa, rounded up villagers, and publicly beat two, allegedly suspecting connection between village & Kurdistan Workers Party, with whom the KDP often has fought. AINA reported similar night raid by dozen of KDP forces on village of Belmat 9/10/99. KDP media quoted village leaders & mayor of Aqra denying that any such blockade or village raids occurred. ICRC confirmed it intervened with KDP after receiving Assyrian request and KDP withdrew from villages thereafter. AINA reported armed KDP members entered Assyrian Patriotic Party (APP) headquarters in Dohuk on October 21 and forced its closure. APP offices were allowed to reopen 4 days later.
In the north, Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians. Both major Kurdish political parties have indicated that Govt occasionally targets Assyrians, as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkmen, in expulsions from Kirkuk, where it is attempting to Arabize the city. Assyrians continue to fear attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party, Turkish-based terrorist organization that operates against indigenous Kurds in northern Iraq. The Christians often feel caught in middle of intra-Kurdish fighting. In December 1997, six Assyrians died in an attack near Dohuk by the PKK. Some Assyrian villagers have reported being pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny PKK access to possible food supplies. Many Assyrian groups reported series of bombings in Irbil in late 1998 and early & late 1999. Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Assyrian Patriotic Party, and other groups criticized investigation into these incidents conducted by the Kurdistan Regional Government. There were no reported arrests by year's end.
Iraqi Kurdish regional officials report prisons in the three northern provinces were open to Intl Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) & intl monitors. Regular & consistent improvement in conditions observed on weekly prison visits, ICRC officials stated. Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) reported they reached agreement for mutual release of political prisoners; however, no such release occurred.

UN SecGeneral estimates more than half a million internally displaced persons remaining in the three northern provinces (Irbil, Dohuk, and Suleymaniyah), most of whom fled government- controlled areas in early 1991 during the uprising that followed the Gulf War. Others are Kurds who fled 1998 Anfal Campaign. Of 1.5 million refugees who fled following the 1991 uprisings, great majority, particularly Kurds, repatriated themselves to northern Iraq in areas where allied coalition prohibited overflights by Iraqi aircraft. Human Rights Watch & other organizations worked with various govts to bring genocide case at International Court of Justice against Govt for conduct of Anfal campaign against Kurds. Approximately 12,000 Turkish Kurds fled civil strife in southeastern Turkey & remain in northern areas controlled by central Government. UNHCR treating these displaced persons as refugees until it reaches an official determination of status.
Special Rapporteur noted unusually high percentage of women in Kurdish areas, purportedly caused by disappearances of tens of thousands of Kurdish men during Anfal Campaign. Special Rapporteur reported widows, daughters, and mothers of the Anfal Campaign victims are dependent economically on their relatives or villages because they may not inherit the property or assets of their missing family members.
As part of Arabization process, Govt continued to deport Kurdish & Turkomen families. Regional Kurdish authorities report between Jan/99 & November, 362 families (total 2,166 individuals) deported from Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, and other areas, and expelled to Kurdish- controlled northern Iraq. They calculate total of 15,620 households (92,740 persons) displaced since 1991. Those expelled are not permitted to return. Special Rapporteur reported citizens who provide employment, food or shelter to returning or newly arriving Kurds are subject to arrest. To encourage departure and prevent displaced persons from returning, Govt reportedly mined area around Kirkuk, and has declared it a military and security zone.   [ This is the province with the oil on the Kurdistan border ]   Roads into area are fortified with military checkpoints. Those being deported required to sign "request" which includes phrase " I signed this form of my own free will." Procedure followed by security forces to evict and deport non-Arab citizens is described by Amnesty International in Nov. report. Citing govt decree, Amnesty International reported expulsion process includes confiscation of all family property & food ration cards issued under UN oil-for-food program, and the detention of one family member to ensure lack of resistance. Once in northern Iraq, majority are resettled in camps with basic supplies such as tents, blankets & food supplied by PUK, KDP & UN agencies.

Govt undertaken so-called " Nationality Correction Campaign" as part of process of Arabization. Some deportees permitted to remain in homes if they relinquish Kurdish or Turkomen identity and register as Arab. Govt denies that it expels non-Arab families. Non-Arabs are denied equal access to employment, education, and physical security. Non-Arabs are not permitted to sell their homes except to Arabs, nor to register or inherit property. Kurdish grade school teachers and low-ranking civil servants are reassigned systematically outside of Kirkuk province, which has been renamed Al-Ta'mim (" Nationalization" ). Revolutionary Command Council mandated new housing & employment be created for more than 300,000 Arab residents resettled in Kirkuk, while new construction or renovation of Kurd owned property reportedly prohibited.
Constitution does not provide for Yazidi identity. Many Yazidis consider themselves ethnically Kurdish, although some define themselves as both religiously & ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds. Govt, without any historical basis, defined Yazidis as Arabs. Evidence Govt compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to join in domestic military action against Iraqi Muslim Kurds. Captured government documents included in 1998 Human Rights Watch report "Bureaucracy of Repression: Iraqi Govt in Own Words," describe special all- Yazidi military detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to "pursue and attack" Muslim Kurds. However, the Government does not hesitate to impose the same repressive measures on Yazidis as on other groups.
Iraq govt Government does not permit education in languages other than Arabic and Kurdish. Public instruction in Syriac, which was announced under a 1972 decree, has never been implemented. In areas of northern Iraq under Iraqi Kurdish control, classes in Syriac have been permitted since the 1991 uprising against the Government. By October 1998, first groups of students were ready to begin secondary school in Syriac in the north; however, some Assyrian sources reported that regional Iraqi Kurdish authorities refused to allow the classes to begin. Kurdish regional authorities denied that they engaged in such a practice. November Kurdistan Observer reported central Govt warned Kurdish region administration against allowing Turkmen, Assyrian, or Yazidi minority school.

Iran   govt

5 to 7 million Kurds live in Iran. In Iran, the Kurds are found in the area known as Kordestan. Their language is banned and teaching of Kurdish history and culture is forbidden. After World War II, their bid for a homeland was put down and the leader was executed. After Khomeini came to power, the ayatollah bombed their villages and camps, creating a lasting insurgency that is active to this day. There are about 200,000 soldiers keeping the lid on Kordestan today, and Kurdistan Democratic party (KDPI) guerillas attack military centers on a regular basis. Iranian government agents have assassinated KDPI leaders in Austria and Germany. The leader of the KDPI is Mustafa Hejri, who is based in Iraqi Kurdistan and seems to get some support from Baghdad. There is also a left-wing group, the Komala, which is supported by the government of Iraq.

DangerFinder< /a> Fielding Worldwide 1998

Syria   govt

1.5 million Kurds live in Syria. Fighting broke out 5/94 between two parties after a PUK leader was assassinated; they decided to settle their differences without a ballot box using anti-aircraft guns & other heavy weaponry in the central mountain town of Shaqlawa.
PKK renounced the old Soviet-style ways 12/95 & Soviet symbols were removed from the PKK flag. Priorities include eliminating rival Kurdish groups. Strongest ally has been Syria's Hafez al Assad. Although Syria withdrew support for the PKK in 1988, it was in rhetoric only. PKK bases inside Syria moved to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan ran operations out of comfortable house in Damascus, Syria & Bekaa Valley until lured into capture & Turkish death sentence as terrorist.

DangerFinder< /a> Fielding Worldwide 1998

Tajikistan   ¤ ;   govt

"Kurds: Use 'em or Lose 'em"   V.B. Saeedpour. Dir.Research Ctr for Research, Kurdish Library
Divided first in the 17th century and again in our own, Kurds struggling to control their lands & destiny have long been vulnerable to the service of alien agendas. In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviets backed the tiny Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran until they closed a deal for an oil pipeline with the Teheran Government. The Republic fell in little less than a year; its leaders were hung in the town square. In the early 1970's the Nixon-Kissinger Administration armed Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas because the Shah of Iran wanted to bring Saddam Hussein to the bargaining table over the Shatt al Arab. When the deal was cut, aid to the Iraqi Kurds was abruptly severed. The revolution led by General Barzani ended tragi- cally in 1975. During the Iran-Iraq war some five years later, both countries supported Kurdish guerrillas in revolt across their borders while they warred on Kurdish opposition within. The latest Gulf episode represents the most insidious use of Kurds to date, for Iraqi Kurds were seduced into a deal with the Turkish government that would culminate in what may be one of the darkest episode in the Kurdish history of this century. Israel & its Jewish supporters in the United States would play a role in promoting Turkey's Kurdish agenda.

In line with U.S. policy, Israel trained & advised Iraqi Kurds during thc Barzani revolution, but their support ended when the State Dept so decreed. Prior to Iraqi chemical attacks on Iraqi Kurds in Halabja in 1988, there was no active Israeli support for Kurds anywhere, except for media & press efforts to draw comparisons between Iraqi Kurds "willingness" to accept "autonomy" and Palestinian refusal to do so. Moreover, media & print was designed to attack Arab "hypocracy" for supporting Palestinian national rights while repressing those of the Kurds. Ironically, promoting Iraqi Kurds as victims while covering Turkey's Kurdish repression is hardly the basis from toclaim the moral high ground. No single Jewish writer has done more to pursue this agenda than pundit Wllliam Safire. In a series of passionate & poignant essays spanning over 15 years, Safire has yet to devote a single piece of writing to the struggle of 15 million Kurds in Turkey. What is most troubling to me as a Jew is that the plight of fifteen million Kurds in Turkey most closely parallels the plight of Jews throughout centuries. For, unlike the Iraqi Kurds who have always been at liberty to be Kurds, those in Turkey were ruthlessly legislated out of their ethnic identity and have remained so for more than sixty years. In 1925, the right to be Kurdish was banned, the most minute infraction of this prohibition severely punished. I remember opening the New York Times on my 51st birthday, March 27, 1981, to read that former cabinet minister Serafettin Elci had just been sentenced to two years & three months at hard labor in Turkey. His crime? He said in public, "I am a Kurd. There are Kurds in Turkey." But no one, Jews included, wanted to hear about Kurds in Turkey.

Neither William Safire nor A. H. Rosenthal have committed passion or pen toTurkey's Kurdish policy. What Safire has done is to skirt the broad issue only to land on the Iraqi Kurd-Palestinian equation. Take for example this 1979 piece: "Drafts of resolutions blow through the halls of the U.N. in New York, presaging the establishment of a separate state for a new "people" called the Palestinians, while no voice is raised in that entire establishment for the legitimate rights of an an cient people now being denied by Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria." "the Kurds are not talking of "self- determination," though that was what they were promised at the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. Nationood is too wild a dream; all they want is the right to live, as Kurds, under whatever flag happens to be flying overhead. They seek autonomy, not sovereignty. They want to be let alone, to have their culture respected. That reasonable quest has provoked the greatest series of hypocrisies in the world today. In their travels in the Middle East, men like Harold Saunders, Andrew Young and Jesse Jackson might ask their hosts the Kurdish question: Why do national leaders who loudly demand a sovereign state for the PLO ruthlessly, and now bloodthirstily, suppress the legitimate rights of autonomy of an ancient people on their own territory?" (The Tennessean 9.24.79)
Writers in Israel tend to follow the same path. In an article printed in the Jewish Journal on October 12, 1979, Fred Ehrman, Chairman of the UOJCA Israel Commission writes: "When the Kurds rebelled in quest of their rights of autonomy in their homeland, they were repeatedly and ruthlessly sup pressed. Yet the world remains silent. Why is their quest for autonomy and "self determination" of no concern to the moral leaders who clamor for the "rights" of PLO murderers? Ehrman also makes passing reference to Turkey, but merely as one of the countries that rule Kurds. In the wake of Halabja, Iraqi Kurds sought to contact Israelis on the assumption that gas attacks reflect the Jewish past. PUK leader Jalal Talabani asked this writer to do so. If the following is fact, Talabani succeeded in making his own connections. A report from Abu Dhabi radio indicated that there were indeed meetings in "occupied Palestine" between Kurdish leaders and Ezer Weizman, Za'aqov Tzur, Gid'on Pat, and Moshe Arens to coordinate a media plan linking killing by gas of Jews to allegations against Iraq as the focus of a media campaign against Iraq. (FBIS-NES-88-183 9.21.88, p. 14)

Beyond the rhetoric of condemnation which gained momentum with worldwide revulsion over chemical weapons use, nothing was done to prevent the final offensive of Saddam Hussein on the heels of his ceasefire with Iran. And so five months after Halabja, in the final week of August, Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds and sent more than one hundred thousand into flight across the border into Turkey. In the Israeli press Turkey was showered with praise for its "humanitarian" act in admitting the fleeing Iraqi Kurds. There was however a story behind the story, a tale obscured in brief phrases beneath headlines that misled American readers. U.S. complicity with Turkey effectively stymied the admission of legitimate humanitarian aid organizations. But this fact never did become an issue in the U.S. press. Ankara denied symptoms of the use of poison gas by Iraq, refused to designate the refugees as such, and deliberately kept the Intl Committee of the Red Cross & the UN High Commission for Refugces at bay. Three of this writer's letters on the topic were published in the New York Times (10.30.88; 4.15.89; 11.22.89). One argued that thc title "humanitarian" was not applicable to the Turks. International aid for the refugees was funneled entirely through the Turkish Red Crescent in spite of the fact that Turkey's Kurds complained bitterly that during a 1983 earthquake in the Kurdish region, out of millions in foreign assistance, most Kurds received not so much as a blanket. Yet there was no criticism of Turkey by members of the Jewish community here or in Israel. Nor was there a hint of protest over Turkey's subsequent treatment of these Iraqi Kurds. The choice was no choice. Weighed against Israel's relations with Turkey, Iraqi Kurds didn't stand a chance. Until nearly three years later when they could be used to press the common agenda of the West, Israel and Turkey in the Gulf crisis.

In the first exodus of 1988, the Israeli government did offer to admit some 200 Kurdish orphans. The Jerusalem Post printed one refugee's response. Interviewed in Turkey by Yehuda Litani, he had this to say, "We all remember how the late Barzani felt towards you, his admiration for everything that had to do with Israel. And now we hear that you are ready to let in 200 Kurdish orphans. What is 200 children compared to the masses of people here in the camps? " The first thing you can do is take in some thousands of refugees like you took in the Kurdish Jews." (Jcrusalem Post 10.15.88) But Israel never offered to take in all refugees. In fact, several Jewish activists contacted the Kurdish Library suggesting that 300 Kurdish peshmerga from the camps might be admitted to Israel to be stationed on the Golan Heights presumably to help defend Israelis against Syrians. In the wake of the 1988 exodus, Jenzsalem Post writer, Yosef Goell took a pragmatic approach to justify the concern of Jews for Kurds: "I would say first and foremost that it is in Israel's interest to support the Kurdish movement as consistently as possible, and not only by offering to take in and care for 200 Kurdish refugee children, although that is a laudably humane undertaking. The essential interest that we share with the Kurds, and with other non-Arab peoples in the region, is an insistence that the region is not a "pure Arab sea" but that there must be room in it for the independence or broad-scope ethnic autonomy of Moslem, but non-Arab Kurds; of Arab but non- Moslem Lebanese; of Egyptian Christian Copts; of non-Arab non-Moslem Sudanese Christians and so-called animists; and yes, of Jewish Israelis...When I see Westerners and Israelis who have fallen under the spell of Palestinian propaganda with its 'inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to national self determination, I try to subject them to the acid test of their attitude to Kurdish national independence. If, as is usual, they have never heard of it or couldn't care less, like the Palestinians themselves who do not possess a micron of empathy for the cause of Jewish, Kurdish or anyone else's nationa1 independence, I write them off as victims of a passing chic who are coming into the court of world opinion with unclean hands." (The Forward 10.7.88)

Taking advantage of the unfolding drama, the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington disseminated an Israel Fact Sheet captioned, "The Kurds, A Test of Arab Veracity" which made these points: "One reasonable evaluation of Arab intentions toward Israel is how religiously and politically different groups are treated within Arab societies and how Arab governments provide for human and political rights for indigenous minorities." Citing Iraqi references to Kurdistan as a "Second Israel" and Kurds as "Zionists," it follows the usual vein: "Arabs demand of Israel the same rights that the Kurds seek from Iraq. … Iraq's response to Kurdish attempts to foster an independent, secular democratic state must weigh heavily in Israel's evaluation of similar rhetoric from the Arab world ahout Palestinian rights." (No. 1. Sept. 1988)   Israeli writers by and large made the same argument pressed through the sieve of righteous indignation over suffering Iraqi Kurds, and assiduously avoided Turkey's neglect of those in refugee camps. Because the "Intifadah" was fast becoming Israel's major headache, Ofra Benjio of Tel Aviv University indicted Western media for ignoring the "Intifada in Iraq." (Ha'arets 9.5.88)   Countering criticism of Israel's handling of the Palestinian uprising, Shmuel Schnitzer played the same tune. "I've been waiting and waiting for the reaction of the enlightened, and not so enlightened world to the war of Iraq on its Kurdish population," he wrote. "And I'm still waiting. I've been waiting for media coverage of the sort that informed the coverage of the uprising of the Palestinian hoodlums against Israeli soldiers. for the tidal wave of disguest and moral out rage, like the one that has inundated us for the past nine months. … the West has accorded recognition of the right to national self- determination for the Palestinian people … But it is not prepared to accord similar recognition to the rights of an ancient people such as the Kurds." Schnitzer then proceeds to indict what he terms the "defective operation of the European conscience." "Theywill not remain silent in the face of evil; but they will carefully select between the evils which they will permit to excite their indignation and those which will leave them in cold indifference. An Arab held in administrative detention will drive them out of their minds. A Palestinian rabble rouser who will be taken to the border for deportation will arouse deep feelings of identification. But two thousand dead Kurds or a hundred thousand Kurds expelled from Iraq to Turkeywill not make them lose a minute's sleep. The whole world knows that a campaign of genocide is going on in northern Iraq. But the victims are Kurds. And the Kurds don't exist as a nation and don't have a right to such an existence according to a world in which justice is weighed by false measures." (Ma'ariv 9.16.88) Nowhere among all these polemics was Turkey's Kurdish polic.y even mentioned.

Kurdish Jews in Israel are used to reinforce official themes. In a report titled "The Kurdish Way" Pamela Kidron noted that "reaffirming friendly relations with Moslem Kurds" has been among the reasons behind the Saharani, the Kurdish festival of Kurdish Jews in Israel. "In Kurdistan the local Agha would send his guards to watch over the campsite at night and protect the empty Jewish houses in town. This time, the Jewish Kurds are watching out for the Moslem Kurds." Even after Halabia and the August 1988 exodus into Turkey, supporters of Israel continued their condemnation of Iraq couched in terms of sympathy for the suffering Iraqi Kurds. But nothingwas forthcoming on the plight of five times as many Kurds fighting for their rights in Turkey. On September 23 Ufuk Guldemir, Cumhuriyet's Washington correspondent, wrote an article captioned "Israel's Shadow on the Kurdish Question." Here are excerpts: "Israel's role in the Kurdish question, while quiet, is active and palpable in the U.S. capital. "joint efforts by the directors of an organization called the Kurdish Program [established by this writer in 1981] which arranged Talabani's visit to the U.S., and the directors of the Helsinki Watch Committees, who have written very critical- ly on the Kurdish question, and Israel, because of their blood ties it is possible to state "On Kurdish issues, there is an Israeli dimension... Kurdish leader JalalTalabani came to the US with the assistance of the Israeli lobby, his visit was made possible by an organization called the Kurdish Program based in New York, whose directors have blood ties with Israel." The article also charges that "Israel" reminded Turkey of "the Kirkuk mat- ter." It was in fact this writer who raised the issue of Turkey's spurious claims to the oilfields in northern Iraq in a letter printed in the Baltimore Sun (11.11.86). The letter contested Turkey's "historical claim to the region" arguing that if conquest is a legitimate basis for claim, the West should be prepared to return all of the Ottoman conquests including Jerusalem and the Balkans to lirkey. The AJC's George Gruen actually argued in support of Turkey's claim. (Newsday 1.21.91). In 1989 when the Kurdish Library mounted a photographic exhibition in the Cannon Rotunda on Capitol Hill, Cumhuriyet reported that the Turkish Foreign Ministry was investigating. Ministry spokesman Murat Sungur told the press that the meeting was "a creation of a new element from the U.S." A Congressional Human Rights Caucus briefing in which this writer participated precipitated this comment from Sungur: "Vera Sacedpour who is renowned for being an enemy of Turkey, who in a sense has made a reputation by working against the unity of Turkey's lands, will speak at this meeting."(Cumhuriyet 10.26.89)

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Israel and Turkey called for a first strike to wipe out Saddam Hussein's armed forces. (Washington Times 8.31.90) Among the first to call for "humanitarian intervention" to save the Iraqi Kurds was none other than Richard Perle. Because his work for Turkey was never mentioned in his public appearances, he was able to play asignificantrole as an"objectiveexpert" servingbothIsrael and lbrkey during the Gulf crisis: for Israel because war would destroy its major Arab adversary; for Turkey because a decimated Iraq would facilitate Turkish ascendancy in the post war Gulf. In a New York Times Op Ed which identified him only as a "resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute & Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration," Perle argued against continued reliance on sanctions and in favor of air strikes to destroy Iraq's military capability. (NYT 9.23.90) Even before the January 16th ultimatum, the Emes reported that a Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf had been established with Perle playing a leading role. The new commit- tee urged Administration elimination of Iraq's military capability as "an explicit goal" of American policy and warned against an objective limited to expelling Iraq from Kuwait. (NYT 12.10.90) Shortly thereafter, the group took a full page ad in the Emes in support of the UN decision to "reject an outcome where Saddam withdraws from Kuwait" and went on to argue that "Even if Saddam Hussein agrees towithdraw from Kuwait, the threat posed by his weapons of mass destruction requires that they be verifiably dismantled - or, if necessary destroyed." Acknowledging that a military solution would "regrettably result in casualties," the group chided Bush for making "Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait our principal objective...We believe that we must also find ways to remove Saddam Hussein's capacity to wage aggression, which now includes chemical and biological weapons and may soon include nuclear weapons as well." The nuclear theme would continue to play out through the ensuing months. Not surpris- ingly, the group claimed that if Saddam won, the stage would be set for another Arab-Israeli war. Signatories to the ad included Douglas Feith, Richard Perle and Stephen Solarz.
Solarz led the House of Representatives in promoting the war, submitting a resolution to approve use of military force. Brooklyn Congressman Major Owens said of the Solarz resolution, "The way the resolution was worded made it totalitarian and anti-Democratic. Instead of giving us two resolutions - one in support of troops in the field and a separate one to approve the president's performance - they insisted on putting them together." The Solarz strategy was apparently to frame the resolution so that a vote against the resolution would appear to be a vote against supporting American troops. Owens was among those who believed that economic sanctions were working and that a peaceful solution should be sought. Rlit Salarz and the State Denartment prevailed. Many in the Christian community took exception. For example, Rev. Finley Schaef said, "We say woe to you who send your men and women to war" as he looked to the U.S. to serve as the world's "moral example." (Park Slope Paper 1.25.91) Nor did Solarz' Israel connection go unnoted. An editorial in the Park Slope Paperhad this to say, "Solarz, a leading Congressional supporter of Israel whose district is home to a large number of Jewish voters, said his position "went way beyond" using force to protect Israel, although protecting Israel was an "additional reasonH for supporting military action. "If Israel didn't exist, I would have taken exactly the same position," Solarz told reporters. What he didn't say was that his decisions were as much carrots to his Turkish constituents. On the other hand, Congressman Charles Schumer, also Jewish, saw force only as a last resort. Exchanges on Capitol Hill were heated. Arguing against the Solarz resolution on the House floor, Owens said, "Once we have the US with a great occupying army in the Middle East, it will be hard for Arabs and Moslems to believe that we did not undertake a grand strategy to control the region and theywill accuse us of having plotted to dominate the Mideast militarily in order to protect Israel." In 1992 Solarz himself became a casualty of redistricting and lost his bid for re-election. Media and press on the Solarz side of the issue promoted the idea that it was not Israel so much as the world that Saddam threatened. But not only did the war serve Israel's agenda, it worked to the benefit of Turkey, which without firing a shot received forgiveness of a $7 billion debt, increased imports of textiles to the U.S . and a host of other percs. The war produced an emasculated neighbor and proved to be a giant step on the ladder to completion of Ankara's Kurdish agenda, the destruc- tion of the PKK.

Not surprisingly, the American Jewish Committee's George Gruen used Iraqi Kurds as the springboard to make a case for Turkey's "claim" to northern Iraq. In an article appearing in Newsday he argued that "When Britain carved up the Mideast, the Iraqis got an oil-rich Turkish province...In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, the international community must begin to redress a historic injustice against Turkey and the Kurdish people [meaning Iraqi Kurds]...From the international legal and ethnic standpoint, Turkey's claim to Iraq's oil-rich north- ern province of Mosul is far stronger than Baghdad's...Iraqi Kurds should be permitted to choose independence or reunion with Turkey." (1.21.91) A virtually identical argument appeared earlier in a letter published in the New York Emes of November 24, 1990. Gruen thus opened the door to justify a Turkish claim to Israel. The Ottomans conquered more than northern Iraq; they conquered the Balkans and the entire Middle East right up to the borders of Iran. If conquest were to be accepted as legitimizing territorial claims, the Turks would have as much claim to Israel as to Iraq. If conquest is a legitimate basis for claim, why the demand that Saddam Hussein's forces evacuate Kuwait which Iraqi forces conquered. Interestingly, both the Newsday article and the Emes letter identified Gruen only as an adjunct professor of international affairs at Columbia University. His role in the American Jewish Committee was never mentioned.
In Israel there was unbounded praise for Turkeys role in the Gulf. Take this example by David Kushner of the Jerusalem Post: Erkegs performance during the Gulf crisis has been received with a great deal of appreciation, sometimes even amazement, by the Israeli public. Not only did Tbrkey support the allied cause, but it appeared to be the most decisive and outspoken in its reaction to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait." Kushner noted that only a few days before in an inter- view published in the Post nlrkey's President Ozal had ex- pounded on "his vision of the new order in the Middle East in which Turkey could assist in solving the Arab- Israeli conflict and help lead the area toward security and economic prosperity. What tipped the balance and placed Turkey solid- ly among the members of the coalition was not only Turkey's traditional support for legality and stability in international relations, but its conviction that its interests lay with the Western countries." (Jerusalem Post 1.3.91)

Moreover the Post was among the first to take Ozal's word when he announced that he would go to the Parliament to lift the ban on speaking Kurdish in public in Turkey. The Turkish Parliament didn't move until months later, and even then provided that the Kurdish language could be spoken in public, but only for "non-political communication." Political" communication would henceforth be punishable under new Anti-Terror Laws enacted at the same time. This was of course not made known to readers of the Jenzsalem Post. In lbrkey, there never was a change of heart; there was simply a change of tactics. Among some Israelis, there was opposition to Saddam Hussein's removal. "We are all with Saddam," one headline read. Labor dove Avraham Burg commented that "in the present circumstances Saddam Hussein is better than any al- ternative." "a Shi'ite empire" emanating from Iran could pose an even greater threat to Israel. (Ha'aretz 3.29.91) Following the exodus of Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf war, a report in the Jewish Press argued along similar lines that "..despite the sen- timents Israel feels for the Kurds, Israel is not expected to rush to intervene in the current uprising in northern Iraq. While the Kurdish rebellion is directed against the regime of Saddam Hussein, which represents a danger to Israel's security, the Kurds are working in coordination with the governments of Teheran and Damascus, which are trying to turn the Kurdish zone into a bridge between Iran and Syria. Creating virtual territorial continuity between the two radical regimes by means of a common Kurdish ally could constitute no less a danger to the peace of the region and Israel's security than did the regime of Saddam. Accordingly, with all sympathy for the persecuted Kurdish minority in Iraq and all Israel's concern over the cruel measures the Iraqis are employing against them, Israel must act not only out of sentiment, but also according to its own security needs." (Jewish Press 4.12.91)

The toll of Kurdish suffering in the Gulf war was far greater than the press or vested interests revealed. The embargo starved Kurds as well as Arabs. Intense and massive coalition bombing raids killed thousands of Iraqi Kurds serving in Saddam's military. There is no ACLU, no "conscientious ob- jector" status in Iraq. One serves - or else. But these realities escaped the attention of the Western and the Israeli press. In the U.S., the public's attention was directed down a well- trodden path. At the height of the exodus, A. H. Rosentha] penned an essay countering Administration fears about Kur- dish aspirations with the usual presumptions: "...the Kurds have said they will not demand independence. They might jump at what the Israelis have offered Palestinians - elections and substantial self government."(NYT 4.2.91) William Safire followed suit. "The way to give the Kurdish people the freedom they deserve is the same way to give Palestinian Arabs, includ- ing those driven from Kuwait, the freedom they deserve: create a new category of sovereignty. The Kurds seek what Palestinian terrorcrats scorn: self-government, with cultural dignity respected, within the borders of an existing state...the world bandied about is 'suzerainty,' which allows the encompassing state a sovereignty limited to defense and central banking, while providing the inhabitants of a region with real autonomy and ethnic identity short of total independence." (NYT 4.15.92) What is most disturbing in these writings is the presumption of these pundits that they are privy to what Kurds want . True, Iraqi Kurdish leaders have for years indicated willingness to accept autonomy. But in twelve years of monitoring Kurdish issues on a daily basis, we have no indication whatsoever that this is actually the case. We are persuaded that Iraqi Kurds have been schooled by their Western friends to tell the West what the West wants to hear. Ironically, it has been the Kurdish armed op- position in Turkey, the PKK, condemned as "Marxist terrorist" by Safire, who have been most forthcoming in expressing the Kurds' desire for an independent greater Kurdistan in the Middle East. But like the countries that house Kurds and their Western allies, Israel and its supporters do not want to hear that Kurdish demands parallel those of Palestinians. Our 1991 study of Kurdish aspirations revealed that an independent greater Kurdistan is the ultimate goal of virtually all Kurds. (See Summary of Results, Kurdish Life, No. 2, Spring 1992)

Throughout the Gulf crisis and to this day, Rosenthal and Safire have continued to hammer away at Iraq with not so much as a good word for the beleaguered Kurds in Turkey, a conflict that escalated at an alarming pace particularly since the instal- lation of the coalition's "protective" umbrella for Iraqi Kurds only. Nothingwaswritten exposing the deal between President Ozal and Iraqi Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. Ozal proposed a federated Iraq in the Fall of 1990, the north for the Kurds, the mid-section for the Turkmen of Iraq and leftovers for the Arabs. In return Iraqi Kurds were to "secure" their border against Kurdish guerrillas from Turkey. Less than two years later, this rapprochment culminated in Kurds killing Kurds when on October 4, 1992, in collaboration with the Turkish military, Iraqi Kurds attacked their kinsmen. In fact, a Safire essay only a week before the outbreak of the October joint offensive against the PKK urges the Administra- tion to "persuade" Turkey to join the U.S. in recognizing and supplying food and arms to the "democratically elected government" of Iraqi Kurdistan in return for its "curbing Kur- dish agitation within Turkey." To call the guerrilla war of Kurds in Turkey "agitation" is to call the L.A. riots a shouting match. Kurds inTurkeywere so crushedbythelate 30's thattheycould not lift their heads, no less their arms until 1984. Since then over 5,000 people died, 2,000 in 1992 alone. Their struggle is defamed, ignored, distorted and manipulated by the Western powers and a Western press. Safire's most recent New York Times essay runs the same gauntlet. Minimizing the population of Kurds in Turkey and exaggerating the numbers in Iraq he argues for U.S. foreign assistance of $150 million to "democratic" Iraqi Kurds who apparently earned this reward in large part for "cooperating with Turkey." As Safire put it, "Pesh Merga fighters behind Masoud Barzani successfully took on the Marxist terrorist Kurds." (NewYorkTimes 5.13.93)

While Israel benefits from Iraq's destruction as an Arab power, its relations with Turkey may very well be detrimental to Israel's future. Beyond peace and security, arid Israel needs water. Shimon Peres and Turgut Ozal already discussed a plan to get water to Israel by creating a pipeline from Turkey traversing Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Peres was right when he ar- gued that "the next war in the Middle East could well be over water, not land, and Turkey is the only land in the region with excess water. (Jerusalem Post 4.28.91) Not surprisingly, the AJC's George Gruen with a grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace, an organization established and funded by Congress, is now studying Turkey's water resources. But the water that Israel seeks originates in the Kurdish region of Turkey - a region that yearns to be free, a region Israel and the West are helping Turkey to keep. Yet in the wake of the Gulf war the Anti Defamation League of B'nai B'rith bought a full page ad in the New York Nunes. The League's solicitation for funds for Iraqi Kurds was headlined, "Who cares ahout the Kurds? We do " "My failure to stop the destruction of the Armenians had made Turkey for me a place of horror, and found intolerable my further daily association with men who, however gracious and accommodating and good-natured they might have been to the American Ambassador, were still reeking with the blood of nearly a million human beings." Henry Morgenthau, U.S. Arnbassador to Turkey (1913-1916)

return to home page   §   email site search courtesy of FreeFind presented by North Orange County Greens.org Santa Ana, Anaheim, Costa Mesa & Garden Grove CA U.S.

Greens WebRing EDIT LISTING